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How Far May Newspapers Go in Criticizing?
Richard Szilagyi*
A NY WRITTEN or printed article which is false and is conveyed
by publication to third parties is defamatory or "libelous."
That is, it is actionable if it tends to subject the plaintiff to hatred, scorn,
ridicule, public contempt or disgrace; or if it induces a substantial num-
ber of respectable community members to avoid, shun, or deprive him of
their friendly association, even though the defamation imputes no moral
turpitude to him.'
Despite a long history of judicial decisions and numerous discussions
and writings by the legal profession, there are few areas of the law so
unsettled as the law of libel. Since World War I, state courts and the
United States Supreme Court have been increasingly concerned with the
problem of freedom of speech and press.2 The struggle which has en-
sued involves the conflict between protection of the individual and pro-
tection of the inherent right of free speech and press.
This controversial task of social engineering has been dropped in
the lap of the United States Supreme Court and involves neither a
unique nor an obscure principle of law. The fundamental problem
underlying the law of defamation is the "balancing and weighing" of
one man's interest against the act of another." This problem is im-
mediately recognizable as being common to all areas of tort law. In
theory, defenses are similar to those for assault, battery or trespass; we
speak of justification or excuse, whereas with defamation, we speak
of fair comment or privilege.
A right or liberty to prepare and publish has been created from the
common law, federal and state guarantees of freedom of the press.
The press enjoys this guarantee by virtue of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and it is applicable to the states by in-
corporation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has for the greater part
arisen from the historical struggles of the common people for free ex-
pression of their thoughts and beliefs in order to bring about political
and social reform.
There is no particular need at this point in our history to advance
the argument that it is necessary in a free institution that the press itself
* B.S., B.A., Kent State Univ.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; Contract Administrator at Pesco Products, Inc., Bedford, Ohio.
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964); See also,
53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander, § 1 and § 13 (1948); Street, Law of Torts, 298-301 (2d ed.
1959); Brown v. DuFrey, 1 N.Y. 2d 190, 134 N.E. 2d 469 at 470 (1956); DeMeo v. Com-
munity Newspapers, Inc., 263 N.Y.S. 2d 244 at 247 (1965); Charles Parker Co. v.
Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A. 2d 440 (1955).
2 Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 5 (1966);
Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W. 2d 719 (1959).
3 Prosser, Torts, 15 (3d ed. 1964); Lawrence v. Fox, supra note 2 at 720.
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be free. There is no question today that it is. The only question that is
really left to be decided is how free.
In light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, it appears
that the courts are so zealous in protecting this freedom, that they are
overlooking the need to protect the individual's right against carte
blanche defamation which may be injurious to his reputation, as well as
to his career.
Reputation in our society is recognized by most persons as a valu-
able possession. Standards of proper living set by members of the com-
munity in which one lives have an important bearing on an individual's
economic and social well being. If an individual's reputation is good, it
leads to confidence, trust, business success, power and office. Any false
accusation against a member of this community in violation of this
standard is necessarily injurious. 4 As so aptly stated by William Shake-
speare:
Who steals my purse, steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
and makes me poor indeed. 5
The right of self-expression, originally defined as a natural right, has
become a civil right, or a right guaranteed or established by govern-
ment.6 Society, by necessity, had to place limitations and modifications
on this natural right of self-expression to prohibit unwarranted exer-
cise of abuse of this liberty. The guaranties of freedom of expression in
effect by 1792 in ten of the fourteen states which had ratified the Con-
stitution, gave no absolute immunity for every utterance. Thirteen of
the fourteen states provided for the right to bring a cause of action in
libel as a statutory crime.7 Today all the states have made provisions
in their respective Constitutions for freedom of the press and the re-
sponsibility for the abuse of that liberty.8
Basically there are two distinct types of libelous publications, libel
per se9 and libel per quod 10 which must be treated differently insofar
as pleadings and proof of damages are concerned:
4 1 Seelman, Law of Libel and Slander in the State of New York 1 (1964).
5 Thayer, Legal Control of the Press 181 (2d ed. 1950); Shakespeare, Othello, Act 3,
Sc. 3.
6 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 5 at 66.
7 1 Seelman, op. cit. supra note 4.
8 See Thayer, op. cit. supra note 6 at 76-84, citations to statutes.
9 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, §§ 8, 41 (1948): Libel per se-A publication respect-
ing a person's reputation, trade, or business is libelous per se if it appears that the
publication in and of itself, without the benefit of an innuendo, casts upon a person's
character in such a manner as to expose him to ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or
detrimentally affects him in his business, trade or profession.
10 Ibid. Libel per quod-A publication which is not libelous on its face, but is
(Continued on next page)
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In libel per se, the plaintiff must allege in his petition charging libel,
the words and phrases that are libelous in the publication. No proof
of special damages is required. Damages are presumed as a matter
of law. It is within the sole province of the court and not the jury to
determine whether or not the publication is libelous per se. If the words
are capable of an innocent construction, the court is so bound to hold."
In libel per quod, the plaintiff must not only plead the extrinsic
facts which give rise to the action for libel, but he must also allege and
prove special damages. If a publication can, by extrinsic facts, or in-
nuendo, be considered either non-libelous or libelous, the question may
be submitted to the jury for determination. 12
The difficulty that the plaintiff encounters when he brings an action
for libel under a state statute can best be illustrated by a review of the
following recent libel cases.
The New York Times v. Sullivan13 is the leading case in a defama-
tion action brought by the plaintiff who was an elected police com-
missioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama against The New York
Times. Basis for plaintiff's action was the publishing of an "editorial"
advertisement which communicated false information, projected certain
opinions, protested untrue abuses, and recited grievances which defamed
the plaintiff. It was further alleged that the publication was made with
reckless irresponsibility in that the defendant knew that the publication
was false from information contained in their own files.
The third and a portion of the sixth paragraph of the publication
were the basis of Commissioner Sullivan's claim of libel.
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country Tis
of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled
from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-
gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire
student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register,
their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into
submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have
bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have as-
saulted his person. They have arrested him seven times-for
speeding, loitering and similar offenses. And now they have charged
him with perjury-a felony under which they could imprison him
for ten years.14
(Continued from preceding page)
alleged to be so by innuendo or extrinsic facts which is injurious to the plaintiff as
described in libel per se above.
11 Ibid; See also, Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E. 2d 860 at 862
(1956).
12 Ibid; Roth v. Atex Products, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 136, 229 N.Y. 2d 916 (1962).
13 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1.
14 Id. at 714.
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The newspaper article did not mention Commissioner Sullivan by
name, but since he supervised the police department, he contended
that the word "police" referred to him, thereby accusing him of "ringing"
the campus with police and padlocking of the dining hall in order to
starve the students into submission. As to the sixth paragraph, he
further contended that since arrests are normally made by the police;
the seven arrests of Dr. King, the other described acts of the
Southern Violators, answering Dr. King's protests with "intimidation
and violence" by bombing his home and assaulting his person and
charging him with perjury, were accusations against the Montgomery
police department, hence to him as Commissioner. 15
The evidence at the trial substantiated plaintiff's claim that some
of the statements contained in the publication were inaccurate and false.
The Negro students who staged the demonstration on the state capitol
steps sang the national anthem; the nine students were expelled by the
state board of education, not for leading a demonstration, but for
demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County Court
House on another day; not the entire student body but most of it, had
protested the expulsion, not by refusing to register, but by "boycotting"
classes on a single day; and that nearly all the students returned the
following semester. It was also brought out that the dining hall had
not been padlocked at any time, but students who had not pre-registered
or requested temporary meal tickets may have been barred. Police had
been deployed near the campus in large numbers but at no time did
they "ring" the campus, nor were they called in for aid in connection
with the demonstration as the article implied.16
Dr. King had been arrested four times, not seven; three of the arrests
took place before Commissioner Sullivan took office and the claim of
assault was in connection with his arrest for loitering which took place
years earlier. Although it was true Dr. King's house had been bombed
twice while his family was inside, both events "antedated" Sullivan's
term of office. The police had on those occasions made every effort to
bring the guilty party to justice. 17
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that
the statements in the article were "libelous per se" and were not privi-
leged, therefore damages were presumed as a matter of law from the
bare fact of the publication itself. In accord with the Alabama law, in
a libelous statement per se, "falsity and malice are presumed ..
therefore, general damages need not be alleged or proved but are pre-
sumed."' The trial court awarded plaintiff Sullivan damages of $500,000,
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 715.
18 Id. at 716.
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affirmed on appeal and affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. Due
to the constitutional issues involved, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment stating
that the rule of law applied by the Alabama Court was ". . constitu-
tionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of
speech and press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in a libel action brought about by a public official against critics
of his official conduct." 19 To support this decision the Supreme Court
stated that the constitutional guarantees prohibit a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct ". . . unless he proves the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false, or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not." 20 Apparently the Supreme Court
gave little weight to respondent's argument that The Times had news
items from prior occasions concerning events alleged in the "editorial."
Had they troubled themselves to peruse these articles, they could have
easily ascertained that the "editorial" contained false material. This
certainly would have sustained the Commissioner's allegation that The
Times reacted with recklessness and irresponsibility, hence libelous
per se.
The United States Supreme Court held the Alabama Statute as
unconstitutional, being inconsistent with the federal rule on the theory
that the Constitution limits a state's power to award damages for libel
in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official con-
duct unless actual malice can be proved.
Alabama law only requires proof of actual malice for an award
of punitive damages. Where general damages are concerned, malice is
presumed. The Alabama rule is the general rule regarding libel actions,
but by placing the press in an untouchable position regarding criticism
of public officials, it leaves the plaintiff without a right to bring an action
for injuries caused by false and defamatory publications.
License to criticize is one thing; but liberty without responsibility
for wrongful use is quite another.2 1
The Alabama law does not permit a public officer to recover puni-
tive damages in a libel action concerning his official conduct unless he
has first made a written demand for public retraction and the defend-
ant either fails or refuses to respond. Plaintiff Sullivan made such a
demand and was refused. The Times did run a retraction on request
of the Alabama Governor stating, however, that ". . . didn't want any-
thing published by The Times to be a reflection on the State of Ala-
19 Id. at 728.
20 Id. at 726.
21 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 6 at 1.
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bama ... " 22 and that by the time the Governor had requested the
retraction, The Times had learned more factual details concerning the
"editorial" which by implication was an admission that all of the state-
ments in the newspaper article were not true. Fair comment, not
truth, was used as a defense by The Times, therefore, it is assumed that
the newspaper had knowledge of the inaccurate statements in the
article.
The United States Supreme Court, commenting on the privilege to
criticize a public official's conduct, relied upon the decision in Bridges
v. California,23 which said in part:
It is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions.
A further substantiation of this principle was pointed out by referring
to Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,24
in which he stated:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government ... Recognizing the oc-
casional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Con-
stitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Interpreting these two cases in light of other previous cases which
dealt with the First Amendment guarantees, The United States Supreme
Court held that criticism on public issues should be ". . . uninhibited,
robust, and wide open . . ." 23 even to the point of being ". . . vehement,
caustic, and . ..unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." 26 Admitting that inaccurate statements could be made under
the climate of free debate, The United States Supreme Court felt that
protection of free expression outweighed any injury which might result
to the plaintiff unless he can prove that the defamation or criticism was
made with actual malice.
Malice, even as defined by the United States Supreme Court, is an
elusive, abstract concept, difficult to prove and difficult to disprove. The
requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent pro-
tection for the plaintiff. It certainly does not place him on an equal
basis in a trial where large syndicated newspapers employ expert libel
attorneys with almost unlimited funds in which to continue their de-
fense through the State court to the United States Supreme Court if
necessary.27
22 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1.
23 314 U.S. 252 at 270, 62 S.Ct. 190 at 197 (1941).
24 274 U.S. 357 at 375, 47 S.Ct. 641 at 648 (1927); A. S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 277 Md.
267, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961).
25 Id. at 721.
26 Ibid.
27 Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 876 (1949).
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Implied in the decision of The Times case, and intimated by Mr.
Justice Black's concurring opinion in which he said, "I base my vote to
reverse on the belief that the First and Fourteenth Amendments not
merely 'delimit' a State's power to award damages to 'public officials
against critics of their official conduct,' but completely prohibit a State
from exercising such power"-28 . . . is the concept that regardless of
the grounds of malice as a right to recover damages in a libel action,
the individual defendants have an absolute, unconditional, constitu-
tional right to publish an article containing any criticisms whatsoever
against government agencies and officials. Likewise, this theme was
stated in the City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 29 ". . . no court of last
resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecu-
tion for libel on government have any place in the American system of
jurisprudence."
The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed its Superior Court judg-
ment awarding damages of $154,000 to candidates for city office in a
libel suit against the Arizona Republic,30 a daily newspaper which
printed statements which were aimed at creating the impression that if
the plaintiff candidates were elected, the city would be opened to vice.
The reversal was based upon the following:
(1) Determination on whether a newspaper publication is libelous
per se or per quod, the entire article must be considered, not
only as to the exact language used, but in the light of its overall
intent and meaning under all circumstances surrounding its
publication;
(2) If an occasion for a privileged communication exists, publica-
tion should be considered to have been made in the exercise of
privilege and the burden then shifts to plaintiff to prove falsity
and that the defendant was motivated by malice in fact in
publishing the defamatory article;
(3) When an article is published under a privileged occasion, malice
cannot be inferred but must be proven;
(4) Personal motive, such as newspaper's desire to defeat candidates
for city offices, was not sufficient evidence of malice as would
destroy privilege.
In Ponder v. Cobb,31 The Supreme Court of North Carolina held
. a privileged occasion is an occasion when for the public good, and
in the interest of society, one is freed from liability that would other-
wise be imposed upon him by publication of defamatory matter." Mr.
28 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1.
29 307 Ill. 595 at 607, 139 N.E. 86 at 90 (1923).
30 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P. 2d 150 (1957).
31 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E. 2d 67 (1962).
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Justice Black in The Times case also recognized that the rules set forth
in the majority opinion had no application where a public official's
private life was under attack, or in matters regarding private citizens.
In Conkwright v. Globe News Publishing Co.,3 2 the opposite view was
held. Here the newspaper article stated that the plaintiff, who was
coaching the Houston Receivers, ". . . shouldn't be coaching any-
thing . . . ." This was held to be privileged on the basis that the com-
ments were reasonable and the criticism concerned matters of public
interest. Therefore, unless the plaintiff could prove the statements were
made with malice he could not recover for libel.
Pending final adjudication by the United States Supreme Court of
The Times case, a jury in New Hampshire Superior Court returned a
verdict in favor of a county official in a libel case,3 3 against a newspaper
columnist who allegedly imputed "mismanagement and speculation."
Plaintiff and county commissioners were in charge of county ski recrea-
tion facilities in New Hampshire. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
affirmed the award, finding that The Times' case which had since been
decided, no bar.
The United States Supreme Court, relying on its decision in The
Times case, reversed the New Hampshire Supreme Court and granted
petitioner a retrial on the basis that respondent failed to prove that the
newspaper column was "... of and concerning him" so as to make
out an action for libel.34
Mr. Justice Brennan stated in the opinion that the "... column on
its face contains no clearly actionable statement." 35 The respondent, in
order to recover, must prove by extrinsic facts that the innuendo im-
plied in the newspaper column was directed at him and that the words
were in fact defamatory, causing injury to his reputation and/or pro-
fession. Mr. Justice Brennan expressed his view that, "'What happened
to all the money last year? And every other year?'" 36 could be taken
32 398 S.W. 2d 385 (1965).
33 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669 at 672 (1966). In Garrison v. State of
Louisiana, 378 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209 (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court held that in the
absence of sufficient evidence that the attack focused on the plaintiff, an otherwise
impersonal attack on governmental operations will not establish a cause of action for
libel.
34 Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 33 at 673.
1. Mr. Justice Brennan held that in order for the Plaintiff to recover damages,
the Plaintiff must show that the claimed implication in the column was made specifi-
cally . . , "of and concerning him" which New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 1,
established as precedent. Also the trial court erred in its instructions which permit-
ted him to recover on the mere fact that he was one of a small group acting for an
arm of the government, not all of whom were implicated, but all were cast with
suspicion.
2. Instructions to the jury which permitted them to find that negligent mis-
statements of fact would defeat privilege of a newspaper reporter when the article
criticized a public official's conduct concerning his office were erroneous.
35 Id. at 672.
36 Ibid; Decision sets forth the pertinent parts of the published column.
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to imply "speculation," or they could also be read, in "context" merely
to laud the new administration for doing an excellent jobY7
During the course of the trial, respondent had offered into evidence,
extrinsic proofs to establish the connection between the article and
himself, and to supply information that would justify his allegations that
the column had a defamatory meaning. "These proofs were that the
column greatly exaggerated any improvement under the new regime ...
his witnesses testified they read the column as imputing mismanage-
ment and speculation during respondent's tenure." 38
Based on that imputation, the respondent offered two theories for
recovery.
1) If the jury found that the column cast suspicion indiscriminately
on the relatively few members of the former management group, re-
gardless of whether or not it was found that the implication of mal-
feasance was specifically at or concerned plaintiff, an award of damages
would be proper. New Hampshire law allowed plaintiff recovery under
these conditions, and
2) That the article, when read, referred specifically to plaintiff as
"the man in charge" at the club and who was responsible for its "fi-
nancial affairs." Several witnesses testified to support this allegation.39
Mr. Justice Brennan disposed of plaintiff's first contention by re-
iterating the opinion stated in The Times case. He stated that the words
'... of and concerning him' . . . were rejected as being inconsistent
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the proposition followed
by the Alabama court, which was: in measuring the performance or lack
of performance of groups, criticism or compliment is usually attached to
the officer or official in charge of the group. To allow the jury to connect
the statements made in the publication with the plaintiff on the above
presumption alone was to ". . . invite the spectre of prosecutions for
libel on government, which the constitution does not tolerate in any
form." In order to support a cause of action in libel, evidence must be
presented to prove that the attack was "specifically directed" at the
plaintiff.40 Were the statements in the article at issue, a definite direct
attack upon the Commissioners and Plaintiff, or if the article stated that
the entire club management were dishonest, the United States Supreme
Court might allow recovery by any member of the group although no
decision was made as to this point.
Plaintiff's second theory was also rejected by Mr. Justice Brennan
as the article did not specifically direct its impact upon him, but
basically discusses the method of operations of the local government.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Id. at 673.
40 Ibid.
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The main issue involved in the case was the determination of
whether or not the Plaintiff was a public official under the definition set
forth in The Times case. The U. S. Supreme Court ruled that he was,
the jury instructions therefore, were erroneous, and privilege is given to
critics conditioned upon defeasance only upon plaintiff showing reckless
disregard for the truth. Mere showing of negligence is not enough to
defeat this privilege.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,4 1 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a
verdict in favor of plaintiff Hill for $30,000 compensatory damages
against the publishers of Life magazine on allegations that they falsely
published a new play representing the experience suffered by plaintiff
and his family. The play, The Desperate Hours, was fictional and did
not represent the true account of the events that took place on Sep-
tember 11 and 12, 1952, but the magazine account implied that the play
was a re-enactment of the Hill experience and used the family name.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision held that a play
which is connected to an actual experience or incident is sufficient to label
it as public interest, thereby bringing the article within the ". . . scope
and protection afforded by constitutional guaranties of speech and
press." 42 Although the action was brought as an invasion of privacy,
the Court equated this to a libel action, since both involve character or
reputation and both depend upon exposure to the public view.
Mr. Justice Brennan stated in the opinion that a verdict for libel
based upon matter of public interest would not be sustained except on
a finding of ". . . knowing or reckless falsity in publication of the article,
and since the jury had not been clearly instructed to that effect . . ."
the judgment was set aside and the case remanded.43 The United
States Supreme Court based their opinion upon New York Times v.
Sullivan.44
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result of the Time,
Inc. case, as it was in accord with the views held in The Times case, but
they stated that the protections of speech and press are too constricted
by the current view of the application of the balancing or weighing doc-
trine to our constitutional freedoms. This permits liability to result from
a jury determination of knowing and reckless falsity.4 5 They believe
that The Times view was too narrow, and thus it would be only a matter
of time before that doctrine would "... pass away as its application to
41 385 U.S. 391, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).
42 Id. at 535.
43 Id. at 547.
44 Id. at 541-542.
45 Id. at 547; See also Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 209 at 219, 379 U.S. 82
(1964).
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new cases proves its inadequacy to protect freedom of the press from
destruction in libel cases." 46
Mr. Justice Black stated that "Malicious and reckless disregard of
the truth can never serve as effective substitutes for these First Amend-
ment words: '. . . make no law .. . abridging the freedom of speech,
or the press . . .' " 47 By equating the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
the right to counsel, which by modern interpretation has been held to
be inflexible and unalterable to the First Amendment guarantees, Mr.
Justice Black feels that in the foreseeable future, freedom of speech
and press will be accorded the same protection, despite inaccuracies or
errors in publication.
By applying The Times to the Time, Inc. case, the United States
Supreme Court failed to distinguish the one major difference which
underlies them, that the plaintiff in one case was a public official where-
as the plaintiff in the other was a private citizen. It is also apparent that
the decision in The Times case, of which the opinion went to great
lengths to point out, was clearly centered upon the fact that the plain-
tiff was a public figure thereby automatically losing his right to complain
of any defamatory remarks directed towards him in his official capacity.
By failing to characterize the two distinctly different types of plaintiffs,
it appears that the United States Supreme Court will apply its privilege
doctrine whenever a news media is involved. It matters not whether
a plaintiff is a public figure or a private citizen, or that his only ap-
pearance in the public limelight was during an unwilling and un-
fortunate incident which thrust him into the news. The Court also dis-
pensed with plaintiff's argument as to the commercial aspect of a play,
magazine and book which. is quite different from an ordinary news
article. It seems that there should be different consideration given to a
newspaper publishing what it deems to be news and a magazine that
editorially advertises a play or book for its own interests and directed
more towards a commercial aspect than in furnishing news to the general
public.
The United States Supreme Court, in striking down state statutes
as being inconsistent with the guaranties of the First Amendment, are
taking away the states' right to determine by their own legal process
and jury trial, whether or not a publication made within their own
jurisdiction, is libelous or not.
46 Time Inc. v. Hill, supra note 41 at 547.
47 Ibid.
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Defenses
Some of the defenses available to the defendant in a libel action are
"fair comment," 48 "absolute privilege," 49 "qualified privilege," 50 and
"truth." 51
The defense of "fair comment," recognized by the courts in libel,
refers to a right or privilege which is accorded to an author or news-
paper to comment in good faith, fairly, and without malice or ill will
upon matters of public interest. It generally amounts to justifiable
opinion, based upon facts, about a person's work rather than his private
life. It may be said to be akin to the "reasonable man" approach.
Justification for this defense is said to be based on the interest of free
discussion on matters of social interest in order to maintain a free and
honest government.52
This defense was intended to provide an equilibrium between free-
dom of speech and press, and protection of individuals from defamatory
abuse which may injure their reputation, profession, or social con-
tinuity. Ordinarily, it does not provide a privilege for misstatement of
facts with these exceptions: if the misstatement is "immaterial," r3 based
upon "true facts," 54 is "substantially" true,55 of "public interest," 56 in-
volves "public" officers,57 or is conditionally privileged based on "prob-
able cause." 5s Fair comment extends to all members of the public, and
must not be made with ill will or malice. The trend today is to expand
this doctrine and to treat criticism against the government and any pub-
lic official relating to political issues as an "absolute privilege" in order
to give the press an "unbridled" freedom of expression. 9 "Privilege"
exists in areas of public concern published for general information and
malice must be proved in order for the plaintiff to recover.
60
48 Street, Law of Torts, 331 (2nd ed. 1959); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev., 876 (1949). Thayer, Legal Control of the Press, 366-
367 (2d Ed. 1950). Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A. 2d 335, 337 (1965); A. S.
Abell Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, 176 A. 2d 340 (1962).
49 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3 at 795-805 (1964); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.
Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P. 2d 150 (1957).
50 Id. at 805-823.
51 Id. at 823-828; Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d 154, 221 N.E. 2d
516 (1966).
52 Noel, op. cit. supra note 27 at 878 (1949); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 501, 77 S.Ct. 1304
(1957).
53 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 5 at 330-338 (1950); A. S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, supra
note 24.
54 Id. at 369 (1950).
55 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3 at 825.
56 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 5 at 363-396 (1950).
57 Ibid.
58 Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265 at 267 (1926).
59 The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1; Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-
Star Inc., supra note 51 at 518.
60 Ibid.
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"Privilege" under the fair comment doctrine has been extended to
critics of plays, art, books, and other literary works. In Fisher v. Wash-
ington Post,61 the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia held that
"so long as comment is speaker's actual opinion based on fact about
matter of public interest they are protected unless . . . grounded in
malice or go beyond discussion of public works or acts if subject of
opinion."
Absolute privilege involves conduct which may otherwise be action-
able, but is blessed with immunity in instances where the social interest
to be served is of the utmost importance. Under this doctrine, a defend-
ant would escape liability without considering his conduct, motive, pur-
pose, or interest. Absolute privilege has been extended to executive
communications, judicial and legislature proceedings, consent of the
plaintiff, husband and wife and political broadcasts.62
The United States Supreme Court has by its recent decisions, par-
ticularly in The Times case, extended the outer perimeter of this doc-
trine, by implication to include any public official within the scope of
his official duties and to public interests which might be served. Al-
though The Times case does not project this doctrine to private life,
reputation, or character; private and public life are so intermixed as to
make them for the most part so homogeneous that they are practically
inseparable.
A qualified privilege, sometimes referred to as "conditional," or
"defeasible" has been accorded to publishers in the advancement of their
own interests, interest of others, common interests, communications to
one who may act in the public interest, and reports of public proceed-
ings.63 The interest to be served is of a lesser degree than that found
in absolute privilege, but it is justified because the information presented
is beneficial to the general public.
Truth at common law, was no defense to criminal libel, even though
the victim of a true but defamatory publication hadn't actually suffered
harm to his reputation by the libel. The defamer was still punishable
on the theory that this remedy would prevent a breach of the peace.
In essence, it was felt that a defamatory statement could possibly en-
rage the victim so as to cause him to do violence to the defamer.
64
Truth as a defense in a civil libel action exists in most state consti-
tutions or statutes today under the term justification. 5 If the publica-
tion is made in good faith and for justifiable ends, it is a complete
defense. Although not true in its early application, it is generally held
61 Fisher v. The Washington Post Co., 212 A. 2d 335 (D.C. 1965).
62 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3 at 795-805 (1964).
63 Id. at 805-823; see also Roth v. U.S., supra note 52 at 1311.
64 Garrison v. State of Louisiana, supra note 33.
65 Seelman, op. cit. supra note 4 at 214.
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under modern interpretation that the publication need only be sub-
stantially correct in order to constitute a defense.
Prior to The Times and Garrison6 cases, the comment or criticism
had to be fair, without malice, and made in good faith; and the privilege
did not embody the right to publish false facts, or to falsely attack a
public official so as to impute to him acts of malfeasance or bad conduct
in office. In Garrison, the United States Supreme Court expanded the
absolute privilege doctrine accorded to public officials regarding their
official conduct in civil libel actions to include criminal libel actions.67
In declaring the Louisiana Criminal Libel Statute unconstitutional, as
being inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
stated that provisions which permit punishment for true statements
made with "actual malice" or false statements made with "ill will"
against public officials conduct concerning his office do not meet the
tests established in The Times case.6 The opinion also set forth the rule
that where criticism of public officials is concerned, criminal libel
statutes must not serve separate and distinct interests from those which
exist in a civil libel action, i.e., the constitutional safeguards of free
speech and press must be guarded to provide uninhibited debate upon
issues of public interest.6 9 Garrison grants Federal officers an absolute
privilege to make defamatory statements for publication in the press
against public officials, official conduct, even though the statements con-
tain "malice in the form of ill will," falsity, or even hatred as long as
the Federal officer was acting within the scope of his employment and
he honestly believed in the statements.70
Despite the United States Supreme Court's limitation that the Con-
stitutional protection does not include those false statements which are
made with knowledge that there exists a high degree of probability
that they are false, or a lie knowingly and deliberately published, or a
false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth; the Garrison
decision seems to carry The Times definition of malice one step further
by granting immunity for ill will when attributed to malice.
Conclusion
Applying the principles outlined in the New York Times case, The
United States Supreme Court has established by judicial decision, a
privilege exists by virtue of our Constitution whereby a person has an
absolute right to publish any statement concerning public officials or
matters of public interest without liability under the protective cloak
66 Noel, op. cit. supra note 6 at 876-877.
67 Garrison v. State of Louisiana, supra note 33 at 212.
68 Id. at 215-216.
69 Id. at 212.
70 Id. at 215; See also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335 (1959); The New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1.
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of free speech and press. This immunization applies equally to both civil
and criminal libel actions. Despite the wording in the opinions which
seem to limit this absolute privilege to criticism of publc officials and
their official conduct, underlying principles can be found, especially in
the concurring opinion, which does not so limit this principle. A re-
view of cases since The Times was decided indicates that this subtly has
been broadly applied to practically every case that has come up before
the United States Supreme Court since The Times decision was handed
down. The classical treatment of malice by our courts in libel actions
has been discarded. Damages can no longer be presumed in libel per se.
Actual malice must not only be proved, but the plaintiff must show that
the defamer made the false statements contained in the publication
with the knowledge that they were in fact untrue, or that they were
made with utter disregard as to their falsity. An instruction to the
jury which allows recovery on a showing that the defendant intended
to inflict harm is not enough. A definition of malice which includes ill
will, evil motive, or intention to injure is constitutionally deficient where
criticism of public affairs and official conduct is involved.
In The Times case the United States Supreme Court failed to estab-
lish just how far down on the organization chart the privilege to criticize
extends, but in Rosenblatt the United States Supreme Court expanded
the traditional view in which only important high ranking officials were
privileged to include at the very least, those officials who have sub-
stantial responsibility, or appear to the public to have control over the
conduct and affairs of government. Implied from recent decisions is
that immunity will be accorded to all who direct their criticism to
even a mere shadow of public or general social interest.
Libel involves important social values in which society has a right
and interest to protect in order to prevent punishing unwarranted at-
tacks upon an individual's reputation, employment, or social status. It
is time for our legal guardians to reconsider the individual's right for
which the Constitution was also designed. Is it wrong to limit a news-
paper's criticism of an individual to honest, ethical and reasonable
bounds? If our courts have restricted a newspaper from publishing
biased and prejudicial articles about an individual who is about to be
tried by a jury for an alleged legal wrong which he has committed on
the basis that this amounts to a pre-conviction; can we apply a lesser
standard to an individual who is defamed unjustly. There is no question
of the power of a newspaper in its ability to persuade the general
reader. To the average reader a published article becomes fact by virtue
of the publication. It is virtually impossible in our daily rush through
life to verify everything that we read.
Where do you draw the line between public and private life? Is it
illogical to assume that an individual who is unjustly injured in his pub-
lic life is also injured in his personal affairs?
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The fact that we are a nation of free people and given wide latitude
in expressing opinions, diversity of actions, and promulgating contro-
versial ideas with relative freedom, a limitation must be established.
This freedom, which stems from our Constitution, can only exist as
long as we recognize that there are responsibilities attached to every
right. Our Supreme Court has indicated in recent decisions which cases
libel actions will not lie. By one stroke of the pen the United States
Supreme Court has all but wiped out responsibility of an individual to
exercise due care when expressing his views. Although the opinions
of these recent cases have intimated a few specific instances where a libel
action would be constitutionally justified, this is mere speculation since
no case has been submitted for a judicial decision. Plaintiffs, relying
on the principles in The Times case, have amended their petitions to
comply with these principles only to have their case reversed, remanded,
or the verdict set aside due to technicalities and difficulties in proving
that defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity or in utter reck-
less disregard of the truth or falsity.
Steps must be taken to allow legal redress for libelous injuries be-
fore our judicial decisions completely submerge this tort. Any solution
should include fairness, honesty, and actions free of substantial negli-
gence.
Unblemished reputation is our most cherished treasure, without this
we have nothing!
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